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SETTING  OUR  FEET:  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF
RELIGIOUS  AND  CONSCIENCE  PROTECTIONS
Hanna Torline*
INTRODUCTION
In an article published in 2017 titled The Equivalence of Religion and Con-
science, Lucien J. Dhooge argues that “religion and conscience are moral
equivalents that require equal legal treatment.”1  In the end, Dhooge con-
cludes that the law should treat religion and conscience as though they are
the same.  While Dhooge reins in his conclusion just a bit—by noting that we
“should proceed with caution in order to address potential negative conse-
quences”2—he reaches his conclusion without considering the important,
and notably different, foundations that underlie the justifications for religious
and conscience protections.  Dhooge’s conclusion that conscience and relig-
ion are “moral equivalents” might be right.  After all, it is a normative (and
complicated) claim.  Thus, it’s possible that Dhooge’s conclusion does not
miss the mark.  But instead of accounting for the wind, setting his feet, nock-
ing the arrow, and taking a calculated shot, Dhooge runs straight for the
bullseye, arrow in hand.  The result may be desirable, but it also may have
been forced.
This Note does not attempt to claim that religion and conscience are not
moral equivalents, that they are not equally important, or that they do not
require equal legal treatment.  Nor does it attempt to claim the converse.
Simply put, it argues that a consideration of the different foundations under-
lying conscience protections and religious protections should give pause to
anyone arguing that the two are equivalent.  This Note concludes that the
rationales behind protecting religion and conscience are different enough to
merit consideration in the debate.  For if religion and conscience are treated
as equivalents under the law, they will be treated as though they are the same.
When litigants bring religion or conscience cases to the courts, they will be
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; B.S., Mathematics, B.A.,
Political Science, Benedictine College, 2017.  I would like to thank Professor Gerard V.
Bradley for his guidance and feedback throughout this process, as well as Professor
Richard W. Garnett for his comments.  Of course, many thanks are due to the editors of
the Notre Dame Law Review for the countless hours spent editing this Note.  All errors are
my own.
1 Lucien J. Dhooge, The Equivalence of Religion and Conscience, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 253, 253 (2017).
2 Id.
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judged in the same way.  The two will be subject to the same exceptions, the
same tests, and the same qualifications.  Again, this might be the best result;
it might even be the bullseye.  But it is also possible that religion and con-
science should both be protected within their separate (though in some
respects, similar) spheres.  Such an arrangement might better protect religion
and better protect conscience.  Whether conscience should be protected in
its own right is an entirely separate question, and one that this Note does not
take up.  Additionally, if it is decided that conscience should be protected on
its own merits, this Note will not point to the line where conscience protec-
tions should be drawn and compare it to the line marking religious protec-
tions.  Instead, very simply, this Note argues that the two lines are not
measuring the same thing.
Part I of this Note will define three forms of conscience—one that is
found only within the context of religion, and two that are found entirely
apart from it—and will explain why the secular claims to “conscience” stem
from different rights than those supporting religious liberty.  Part II will
argue that the Founders understood conscience to be intrinsically tied to
religion, and it will discuss the role that this conception of conscience played
in the early drafts of the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion and in the enacted versions of state constitutions.  Part III will progress
through a timeline of the Supreme Court’s understanding of the word relig-
ion, beginning with the early Court, moving through the conscientious objec-
tor cases after World War II, and ending with the Court’s current
jurisprudence.  Finally, Part IV will argue that the Free Exercise Clause was
not intended to incorporate the same protections of conscience which
Dhooge argues it should be used to protect today.
I. DEFINITIONS
A. Religion
Before proceeding to define conscience, it is first necessary to provide a
workable definition of religion.  In part, defining religion is the entire crux
of this Note, as it concludes that the Supreme Court has defined religion too
broadly by drawing the borders of the word around an entirely separate con-
cept: secular conscience.  For the purposes of this Note, the definition of
“religion” will “adhere[ ] to traditional traits . . . especially the existence of
and belief in a supreme being.”3  This conception of religion encompasses
belief systems which include “three components: (1) belief in a deity; (2)
with duties in this life; and (3) a future state of rewards and punishments.”4
While this Note will utilize this definition of religion moving forward, it is not
premised on the supposition that this is the correct definition of religion as it
is used in the First Amendment.  Rather, defining religion in this way simply
3 Id. at 258.
4 Lee J. Strang, The Original Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Test Case of
Originalism’s Utilization of Corpus Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1683, 1687 (2017).
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helps to differentiate between the concepts of religion and certain types of
conscience.
While the Supreme Court traditionally defined religion as necessitating
a belief in a higher being, the Court later broadened its definition to include
even agnostic belief systems where
the adherent’s words and deeds were motivated by a devotion to goodness
and virtue for their own sake . . . as long as such [a] belief system was sincere,
meaningful, and occupied a place in the life of the possessor parallel to that
occupied by belief in God in the life of a religious adherent.5
For now, it is enough to recognize that these two definitions differ from one
another and to know that this Note, when talking about “religion,” will be
referring to the former definition.
B. Conscience
Moving now to conscience, Dhooge primarily discusses two types of con-
science in The Equivalence of Religion and Conscience.  These two—“traditional”
and “individual”—are the ones most relevant to the Free Exercise Clause.
Briefly, this Note will also discuss a third type of conscience: “learned” con-
science.  The “learned” definition of conscience has not been embraced by
legal scholars or judges, so its intricacies are not as important for the pur-
poses of this Note.
The first type of conscience will be called “traditional.”  In its simplest
form, it claims that “God gave us our conscience.”6  Thus, traditional con-
science is intrinsically linked to a claim of authority.  Since this traditional
conscience is understood as a projection of God’s will into human hearts,
many Christians, and undoubtedly those of other theistic religions, believe
that following one’s conscience is even more important than following the
commands of human authority or of an individual’s autonomous desires.
Those who adhere to the traditional view believe that “[m]oral conscience,
present at the heart of the person, enjoins him at the appropriate moment to
do good and to avoid evil.”7  This type of conscience was the “battle cry of the
Protestant Reformation,”8 which professed that “God alone is Lord of the
conscience.”9  And Gaudium et Spes outlined traditional conscience when it
explained that “[i]n the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he
does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. . . .  [A]
5 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 259 (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166
(1965)).
6 Lynne Lee, How to Hear God—Through Our Conscience, A CLOSER WALK WITH GOD
(Dec. 11, 2006), http://acloserwalkwithgod.blogspot.com/2006/12/how-to-hear-god-
through-our-conscience.html.
7 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1777 (2d ed. 2000) (footnote omitted).
8 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1490 (1990).
9 Id. at 1490.  This phrase later became a part of the Calvinist Creed. Id. at 1490
n.417.
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law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he
will be judged.”10
Those who adhere to the traditional view of conscience ascribe its foun-
dations to God.  Because conscience comes from God, and because a per-
son’s greatest good (attaining salvation) depends upon following divine
instructions, people must be allowed to follow their consciences.  Or, at least,
so goes the argument in favor of protecting traditional conscience.  For
divine instructions—to the believer—carry more authority than the com-
mands of the state or even the desires of the individual himself.  Thus, if one
believes that the individual has a right, or even a duty, to place God in the
highest seat of authority, and also believes that conscience is a manifestation
of God’s commands, it follows that the state must respect conscience.  Even if
the state does not recognize the existence of a supreme being, if its citizens
(from whom the state derives its power) believe they owe a higher duty to
God, the state’s proper role requires it to respect this primary place of God.11
Such was the view of the Founders, which will be discussed in the next Part.
A second type of conscience will be called “learned.”  The learned con-
science may be attributed to a few different sources.  One claim is that
learned conscience is “genetically determined, with its subject probably
learned or imprinted as part of a culture.”12  A person’s learned conscience
forms as community standards are imposed upon that person throughout his
or her life.  Those community standards “teach” the conscience appropriate
behavior and values.  The psychologist Sigmund Freud spoke of this
“learned” conscience when he argued that conscience originated through
the sense of guilt we feel upon acting against social norms, which embed
10 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN
THE MODERN WORLD [GAUDIUM ET SPES] § 16 (1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/
hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.
html.
11 But see Bruce Ledewitz, The Vietnam Draft Cases and the Pro-Religion Equality Project, 43
U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2014) (“Michael Paulsen argues that religious exemptions are
only coherent when they are understood to rest on the claim that ‘true religious obligation
is more important than civil obligation.’  And by true religious obligations, Paulsen means
the assumption that God exists and that God’s commands are made known to the believer.
For Paulsen, religion in the exemption context must be theistic.  While I believe that Paul-
sen’s account fails as an actual description of government granted religious exemptions
from the law . . . I agree with him that for the believer, the commands of God are superior
to those of the state.  That is true by definition, but . . . [t]he believer does not need the
state’s permission to obey God rather than man.  The believer is going to be willing to
suffer almost any fate, and certainly any fate an American government would impose,
rather than disobey God.” (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1160
(2013))).
12 DUCO A. SCHREUDER, VISION AND VISUAL PERCEPTION 55 (2014).
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themselves in individuals through external disapproval of aggression.13  Simi-
larly, Charles Darwin argued that conscience evolved
from the “greater duration of impression of social instincts” in the struggle
for survival.  In such a view, behavior destructive to a person’s society . . . is
bad or “evil.”  Thus, conscience . . . [is] experienced as guilt and shame in
differing ways from society to society, and person to person.14
If the law were to protect such a view of conscience, that protection
would not be derived from the same duty-based theory that supports protect-
ing “traditional” conscience.  For, if conscience is a person’s individual,
learned response to a community interaction, and if society is responsible for
imprinting such a conscience into someone’s mind, then how can a person’s
duty to her conscience be distinguished from her duty to society—in other
words, to follow the law?  Certainly, the state is simply a more formal repre-
sentation of society’s views and values.  Thus, the state’s actions (laws) are
often the formalization of a collective, societal conscience.  And since the
pulls of an individual’s conscience are neither the product of individual
choice nor the imprint of the will of God, there is no higher authority to
which the state should submit.  This is not to say that there are no other justifi-
cations for protecting learned conscience.  But duty is not one of them, and
neither Dhooge nor the Supreme Court have offered alternatives.  Thus the
merits—or demerits—of its protection will be left for other scholarship.
Finally, the most popular conception of conscience, at least as it is used
today, will be called “individual.”  Dhooge describes this type of conscience
when he identifies its two main features: belief and response.15  He writes
that “[b]elief refers to individual notions of right and wrong, which in turn
influence decision-making and judgments.”16  One scholar describes individ-
ual conscience as “defined by the individual, therefore reflecting subjective
concepts chosen by the individual alone.”17  This conscience does not neces-
sarily come from God, nor is it imposed upon an individual by society.  It is
instead the result of the individual’s own moral judgments.
Dhooge points to the right in which such a freedom of individual con-
science might be grounded: “Decisions and judgments based upon such eval-
uations create a moral consciousness for each individual and provide him or
her with a sense of self.  This ‘moral consciousness’ and ‘sense of self’ are
entitled to respect by others as an affirmation of individual autonomy and
personhood.”18  His argument claims that individual conscience is entitled to
13 See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 82–90 (James Strachey ed. &
trans., 2017) (1930); ERICH FROMM, GREATNESS AND LIMITATIONS OF FREUD’S THOUGHT
126–27 (1980).
14 Leon L. Combs, Conscience, LIVING THEOLOGY (Apr. 2010), http://livingtheolo
gy.com/Conscience.html.
15 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 266.
16 Id.
17 Laura S. Underkuffler, Individual Conscience and the Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 93
(1992).
18 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 266–67 (footnote omitted).
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protection because of the importance and primacy of individual autonomy.
Maybe so, but this argument does not sound in the same vein as the duty-
based argument for traditional conscience. Such a duty-based argument could
be made for individual conscience, which might be similar to that for protect-
ing “traditional” conscience. The right to individual conscience might stem
from a duty owed to something higher than the state; but, unlike in the case
of traditional conscience, that duty would be owed not to God, but to oneself.
Thus, in order to argue for its protection, this argument must claim that a
person’s duty to his or her self occupies a higher place in his or her life than
that person’s duty to the state.  If so, this is a hierarchy that the state should
protect, just as it protects the religiously motivated hierarchy that recognizes
God as above the self and the state.19  But this is only the case if we can first
justify the hierarchy that places the individual above the state.  Neither this
Note nor Dhooge’s article attempts to do so.
II. THE FOUNDERS’ CONCEPTION OF CONSCIENCE
Generally present in the thought of the early Founders and in Supreme
Court jurisprudence was the first of these three definitions of conscience.
The Founders conceived of conscience as “either expressly or impliedly lim-
ited to religious conscience.”20  Many of John Locke’s ideas on religious tol-
eration provided the foundation for the Founders’ strong preference for
religious liberty and religiously motivated conscience claims.  “Locke thought
that coercing people into religious beliefs was contrary to Christianity and
ultimately ineffective because only freely held beliefs led to salvation.”21  At
19 Dhooge goes further by asking, “specifically, what types of belief may serve as a
motivating factor for acts to be deemed those of conscience”? Id. at 267.  Are they only
those beliefs which address life’s ultimate questions?  Or those which concern morality?
Dhooge rejects that the “ultimate questions” aspect is necessary and ignores the morality
question by stating that individual cases will show that such a distinction will be unneces-
sary in practice, as “claims of conscience for which legal protection is sought almost always
involve moral content rather than personal predilection.” Id. at 268 (citing Kent Greena-
walt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 908 (2010)).  In sum, the idea
of individual conscience involves a “conscience-based response[, which] is ‘a kind of moral
imperative central to one’s integrity as a person.’” Id. at 269 (quoting BRIAN LEITER, WHY
TOLERATE RELIGION? 95 (4th prtg. 2014)).
20 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1493.
21 Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457,
1465 (2013) (footnote omitted).  It is further important to note that in 1620, the English
settlers fled to America in large part to escape religious persecution in their home country.
The ensuing settlers largely followed in their footsteps, many as Protestants looking to
remove themselves from the hold of the Church of England, or the Anglican Church.  But
scholarship regarding early American religion focuses too often on the specific religious
views of the Founders or on the fact that some colonies proceeded to establish churches
while ignoring the reality that America began primarily as a “religious refuge.”  In fact,
many of the settlers in the seventeenth century entered America “in the face of European
persecution, refus[ing] to compromise passionately held [Christian] religious convictions.”
Religion and the Founding of the American Republic: America as a Religious Refuge: The Seventeenth
Century, Part 1, LIB. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel01.html.
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the same time, Locke did not extend his “toleration” to nontheistic belief
systems.22  His belief in religious toleration was inextricably tied to his desire
to attain “the salvation of [men’s] souls”23:
For there being but one Truth, one way to heaven; what hopes is there that
more men would be led into it, if they had no Rule to follow but the Religion
of the Court; and were put under a necessity to quit the Light of their own
Reason; to oppose the Dictates of their own Consciences; and blindly to
resign up themselves  to the Will of their Governors, and to the Religion,
which either Ignorance, Ambition, or Superstition had chanced to establish
in the Countries where they were born? . . . [If this were the case,] Men
would owe their eternal Happiness or Misery to the places of their Nativity.
These Considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged
to the same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to conclude, that all the Power
of Civil Government relates only to Mens [sic] Civil Interests; is confined to
the care of the things of this World, and hath nothing to do with the World
to come.24
Although Locke’s ideas were not generally accepted in England,
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison built upon them, extending Locke’s
religious “toleration” to the greater ideal of religious “freedom.”  In the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights, George Mason adopted some of Madison’s lan-
guage regarding religious toleration, settling on:
[R]eligion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience . . . .25
Thirteen years later, in 1789, the United States’ Bill of Rights was submit-
ted to the states for ratification.  Before its adoption in 1791, the text of the
First Amendment underwent numerous changes.  Some of the drafts specifi-
cally included the word conscience as protected equally alongside religion.
But the final draft did not include the word.26  Why would that be?  One
possibility is that the Founders meant conscience in the traditional sense; to
them, ideas of conscience and religion were intrinsically linked.  If so, then
there could be no conscience without a religious basis, for, as Thomas Paine
argued in Rights of Man, “[m]an worships not himself, but his Maker; and the
liberty of conscience which he claims, is not the service of himself, but of his
22 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 52–53 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010).
23 Id. at 9.
24 Id. at 14–15 (footnote omitted).
25 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XVI.  The Virginia Declaration of Rights
was drafted by George Mason but the final version was adopted in 1776 after changes were
made by Robert C. Nicholas and James Madison.  Library of Va., The Virginia Declaration of
Rights, June 12, 1776, SHAPING CONSTITUTION, http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_class
room/shaping_the_constitution/doc/declaration_rights.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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God.”27  Thus, for the Founders, including the free exercise of “conscience”
along with the free exercise of “religion” would have been redundant.
A look at the debates in the First Congress regarding the Free Exercise
Clause will show this connection between conscience and religion.  Although
most of the disagreement in the recorded debates in the House of Represent-
atives was focused on the Establishment Clause, important changes were
made to the Free Exercise Clause as well.  In fact, Madison’s initial proposal
for the Free Exercise Clause was much more expansive than what was, in
time, adopted.  In 1789, Madison proposed the following: “The civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall
any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”28  But when the
Senate debated the religion clauses, the drafts were much shorter.  Three
versions were adopted and then rejected.  In order, they are: “Congress shall
make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others,
nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed”;29 “Congress shall make no
law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”;30 and
“Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of wor-
ship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion . . . .”31  Finally, the version
proposed by a Conference Committee on which Madison served was ratified,
preferring “free exercise of religion” to “rights of conscience.”32
An objection to the omission of “rights of conscience” was only voiced by
the representatives of Virginia.  “In Virginia, the Senate delayed ratification
of the first amendment, partly on the ground that it ‘does not prohibit the
rights of conscience from being violated or infringed.’”33  But since neither
Virginia’s own bill of rights nor the federal amendment that the state pro-
posed included this language, the historian Leonard Levy opines that Vir-
ginia’s opposition might be better attributed to “Antifederalist political
maneuvering rather than to serious substantive opposition to the language of
the first amendment,”34 especially considering the fact that Virginia later rati-
fied the same amendment without complaint.  Similarly, Dhooge argues that
the fact that the terms “religion” and “conscience” were synonymous, or
“interchangeab[le at the time of the Founding,] renders the exclusion of
27 THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 78 (8th ed. 1791).
28 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)(proposal of James
Madison, June 8, 1789).
29 CTR. FOR LEGISLATIVE ARCHIVES, NAT’L ARCHIVES, CONGRESS CREATES THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 30 (2015), https://www.archives.gov/files/legislative/resources/bill-of-rights/
CCBR_IIA.pdf.
30 Id. at 29 (quoting CONST. art. III).
31 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 166 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972).
32 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1484.
33 Id. at 1485 (quoting C. ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 145
(1964)).
34 Id. (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 86–89 (1986)).
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conscience from the Free Exercise Clause and the reasons, thereof, of lesser
importance.”35
Further discussions of conscience by the Founders support the proposi-
tion that conscience and religion were seen as interchangeable (and thus
that the Founders conceived of conscience in the traditional sense).  James
Madison, when lending support for the Bill of Rights, claimed that, despite
the absence of the word “conscience” in the text, the Free Exercise Clause
meant “that Congress should not . . . compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience.”36  So we must ask: What exactly did
Madison mean by conscience?  To begin, Madison’s comments regarding the
disestablishment of religion in Virginia in 1785 might be of some help.
Madison supported the disestablishment, stating that “[t]he Religion then of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it
is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”37  Madison’s
desire to prohibit government infringement on religion and conscience is
illuminated by a statement he made at the Virginia Ratifying Convention.
There, Madison stated that “[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion.  Its least interference with it would
be a most flagrant usurpation.”38  Essentially, Madison believed that religion
occupied a place beyond the reach of the government.  A place, in other
words, above its reach.
Samuel Adams’s words, too, are helpful in understanding the Founders’
conceptions of religion and conscience.  Adams delivered his famous “On
American Independence” speech in Philadelphia just one day before the
Declaration of Independence was signed: “[F]reedom of thought and the
right of private judgement in matters of conscience, driven from every other
corner of the earth, direct their course to this happy country as their last
asylum.  Let us cherish the noble guests and shelter them under the wings of
a universal toleration.”39
Undoubtedly, Adams’s speech glitters with language of toleration and
freedom of conscience.  But just as undoubtedly, Adams’s use of the word “con-
science” was tied to a traditional view of conscience, which had a religious
connotation.  The very next line of Adams’s speech implores the United
States to “[b]e . . . the seat of unbounded religious freedom.”40  And the
speech includes an explanation of why religious toleration is necessary.
Adams explains that the reformers in England “lopped off indeed some of
the branches of popery, but they left the root and stock when they left us
35 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 278.
36 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis added).
37 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
38 General Defense of the Constitution, [12 June] 1788, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0077 (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
39 Samuel Adams, On American Independence, in 1 MEMORABLE AMERICAN SPEECHES 69,
89 (John Vance Cheney ed., 1907).
40 Id.
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under the domination of human systems and decisions, usurping the infalli-
bility which can be attributed to revelation alone.”41  He argues that indepen-
dence was necessary because the British government had “dethroned one
usurper only to raise up another; they refused allegiance to the pope only to
place the civil magistrate in the throne of Christ, vested with authority to
enact laws and inflict penalties in his kingdom.”42  Here Adams, like
Madison, makes a claim that the highest authority is found in the commands
of God.  Such commands must be followed above all others, even those of the
state.
Such a view of God’s authority was shared by most of the Founding gen-
eration: “Religious freedom, as understood by the Founders, could . . . be
seen as the most important right, because it is founded on the highest duty of
the individual: the duty that he owes the Creator to worship Him according
to the dictates of his own conscience . . . .”43  Thus, the guarantee of the First
Amendment to protect the free exercise of religion was intended by the
Founders to protect the duty that a person might owe or believe he owes to a
higher power.
The same reasoning protected a person’s right to traditional conscience,
since throughout the early history of America, “the vast preponderance of
references to ‘liberty of conscience’ . . . were either expressly or impliedly
limited to religious conscience.”44  James Madison “used the terms ‘free exer-
cise of religion’ and ‘liberty of conscience’ interchangeably when explaining
the meaning of the first amendment.”45  Samuel Adams linked “matters of
conscience” to “religious freedom.”  And even Dhooge admits that, at the
time of the Founding, “ ‘religion’ and ‘conscience’ were interchangeable”46
terms.  And because conscience was so intrinsically tied to religion—as con-
science was something that was given to people by God as a sign of His will
for their lives—“[t]he primary argument for religious freedom . . . was the
inviolability of conscience.”47  It is from this early understanding of con-
science and religion that the Supreme Court began to work on defining (and
expanding) the term itself.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S UNFOLDING UNDERSTANDING OF “RELIGION”
This Part will track the Supreme Court’s definitions of both conscience
and religion throughout different time periods of America’s history, and it
will explain how this progression has brought us to the working definitions
that exist today.  The focus is primarily on cases the Court decided regarding
41 Id. at 88–89.
42 Id. at 89.
43 David Upham, The Primacy of Property Rights and the American Founding, FOUND. ECON.
EDUC. (Feb. 1, 1998) (emphasis added), https://fee.org/articles/the-primacy-of-property-
rights-and-the-american-founding/.
44 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1493 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 1494.
46 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 278.
47 Id.
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the Free Exercise Clause, as these cases most clearly address the different
conceptions of conscience as they are discussed in this Note.  The general
theme throughout the Supreme Court’s decisions and its definition of relig-
ion (and inclusion or exclusion of conscience) is “expansion.”  In each new
era, religion is more expansively and broadly defined.
A. Early Cases
In early Supreme Court cases, “traditional traits”48 were used to define
religion.  In particular, religion was intrinsically linked to belief in the exis-
tence of a divine or supreme being.  Prior to the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, “[t]here was no recorded controversy . . . in which the right of
‘conscience’ was invoked on behalf of beliefs of a political, social, philosophi-
cal, economic, or secular moral origin.”49  The same notions extended
throughout early Supreme Court cases, as it was commonly recognized that
religion would not include beliefs attributed to a person’s secular (here,
“individual” or “learned”) conscience; it was supposed that those beliefs
stemmed from the individual or that individual’s society and community, but
not from God.
Early Supreme Court jurisprudence adopted the view that religion was
intrinsically tied to belief in a creator or higher power.  In 1890, the Court
said that religion “has reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator,
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character,
and of obedience to his will.”50
B. Conscience with Respect to Military Service during the Vietnam Era
During the era following the first two World Wars and into the Vietnam
War, the Supreme Court, for the first time in its history, “extended religious
exemptions to persons with essentially secular claims of conscience.”51  It is
possible that the Court’s jurisprudence in these cases serves only as an oft-
studied exception for the Court, but its decisions undoubtedly illuminate our
relevant inquiries.  Three cases will be discussed in this Section, all of which
deal with war-time conscientious objectors: United States v. Seeger,52 Welsh v.
United States,53 and Gillette v. United States.54
In 1958, Congress had broadened the Universal Military Training and
Service Act to allow a draft exemption to anyone who, “by reason of [their]
religious training and belief, [is] conscientiously opposed to participation in
48 Id. at 258.
49 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1494.
50 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
51 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1491 n.420.
52 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
53 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
54 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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war in any form.”55  The statute specifically defined religious training and
belief as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [did] not include
essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.”56  The Supreme Court first considered a challenge to this stat-
ute in Seeger and came to a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clark,
that nontheistic belief systems fell within the statutory definition of
religion.57
In 1965, the Court in Seeger defined religion more broadly than it ever
had before.  First, it stated that the term “God” included not only what might
be considered the “orthodox God,” but also “the broader concept of a power
or being, or a faith, ‘to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent.’”58  The Court quoted the philosopher and theolo-
gian Paul Tillich, who essentially argues that it is not possible to derive mean-
ing from meaninglessness.  In a passage quoted by the Court, Tillich writes
that there exists such a state where “the God of both religious and theologi-
cal language disappears,” but still a higher meaning (and thus, he argues,
religion) is found in “the seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within
meaninglessness is affirmed.”59  Thus, taking cues from Tillich, the Court
reasoned that even if a man might not attribute his beliefs to a particular
religion or even describe them as religious at all, they are religious in nature if
he derives from those beliefs some sort of meaning.
The Court then stated that the appropriate test to apply when determin-
ing whether a particular belief falls within the protections of the exemption
statute “is [to ask] whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occu-
pies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”60  This test asks
whether the meaning that the belief in question affirms is as meaningful as
one’s belief in the orthodox God might be.  Bear in mind that, despite its
broad definition of God, the Court still maintained that “in the forum of
conscience, duty to moral power higher than the State has always been
maintained.”61
Thus, although the Seeger Court focused on the importance, or meaning-
fulness, of one’s sincerely held belief (whether traditionally characterized as
religious or not), Justice Douglas in his concurrence still felt the need to note
that none of the claimants professed to be “an avowedly irreligious person
55 Ledewitz, supra note 11, at 47 (first alteration in original) (quoting Universal Mili-
tary Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)).
56 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)).
57 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
58 Id. at 174 (citation omitted).
59 Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY 12 (1957)).
60 Id. at 165–66 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 170 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes,
J., dissenting)).
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or . . . an atheist.”62  But why was this distinction necessary to make?  Does it
imply that the result might have been different if a claimant had insisted that
he was a staunch atheist?  Perhaps if one of the claimants had in fact called
his beliefs nonreligious, it might be more accurate to say that Seeger “eroded
any distinction between religious and nonreligious claims to conscientious
objection,”63 as Professor Kent Greenawalt so claimed.  But as it stands, the
Supreme Court in Seeger, at the very least, avoided stating that it was doing
any such thing.  Instead, the Court found meaning in the claimant’s beliefs,
and thus attributed that meaning to a broadly defined “God.”  In other words,
it found that the claimant’s beliefs were in fact religious, whether the claimant
himself recognized them as such or not.
The following case, Welsh v. United States, came five years after Seeger and
dealt with the same statute.  However, in 1967, an important change was
made to the Military Selective Service Act: Congress deleted the words
“Supreme Being” from the conscientious objector statute after the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Seeger was released.64  It was with this new language—and
the seeming assent of Congress to the Court’s prior decision—that Welsh was
considered.
In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Black, the Court in Welsh
reached the same conclusion that it had in Seeger, while at the same time
failing to reaffirm its prior reasoning.  Under the facts of the case, Welsh had
altered the draft exemption application by striking the words “my religious
training and” from the form, and stating that it was an open question
whether or not he believed in a Supreme Being.65  Although not compelled
by religious belief, Welsh “believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical,
and immoral, and [his] conscience[ ] forbade [him] to take part in such an
evil practice.”66  The plurality seized this opportunity to take a substantive
move forward in the Court’s jurisprudence.
Instead of claiming, as the Court did in Seeger, that the claimant’s beliefs
were religious and involved some belief in meaning and thus “God,” Justice
Black rather said that:
What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant’s conscientious objection to all
war to be “religious” within the meaning of [the Universal Military Training
and Service Act] is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant’s
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that
these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.67
62 Id. at 193 (Douglas, J., concurring).
63 Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 909
(2010).
64 See Ledewitz, supra note 11, at 50–51 (“This change did not figure directly in the
Court’s next case, Welsh, but on the other hand, the statutory change must have been
viewed by some of the Justices as supportive of the general approach in Seeger, an approach
upon which the Welsh plurality relied to an overwhelming degree.”).
65 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335–37 (1970) (plurality opinion).
66 Id. at 337.
67 Id. at 339–40.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL110.txt unknown Seq: 14 25-NOV-19 13:47
488 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
By finding it necessary to separate “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,” Justice
Black was essentially saying that these types of beliefs are distinct, and that
beliefs which are not religious but are moral or ethical should be protected as
well.  Again, this reasoning is not the same as that in Seeger, which affirmed
that only religious beliefs should be protected, even while it broadened what
religion itself encompassed.
The plurality in Welsh went even further by stating that nonreligious
belief systems might occupy “a place parallel to that filled by . . . God”68 in
individual persons.  If this is the case, the plurality argued, they should be
afforded the same protection.69  But again, here the Court did not attempt to
say that secular conscience is the same as religion.  Instead, it said that secu-
lar conscience is entitled to protection if it occupies “a place parallel to that
filled by . . . God”70 in people of faith, and such conscience claims could be
based even on “history and sociology.”71  It thus said that secular conscience
claims are as important as religious claims and extended the protections of
the statute to entirely nonreligious claims.72
It is necessary to note Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh, in which he
stated that the Court in Seeger—of which he was a part—had “‘embrac[ed] a
secular definition of religion’ that conflicted with Congress’ language and
intent.”73  While Justice Harlan argued that the Court could not simply
rewrite the statute against Congress’s intentions, he said that Congress had
violated the Establishment Clause by allowing conscientious objection based
on religion but disallowing the same objection based on “secular beliefs.”74
Further, he argued that Congress had violated the Establishment Clause by
preferring “theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand,” over
68 Id. at 340 (omission in original).
69 Id. at 340  (“If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethi-
cal or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of con-
science to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy
in the life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God.’” (omission in
original)).
70 Id. (omission in original).
71 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 259.
72 It is perhaps helpful in considering these three conscientious objector cases to look
back to a statement made in 1789 by Thomas Scott, a Representative of Pennsylvania, who,
when discussing a constitutional exception for those “religiously scrupulous [of bearing
arms],” stated:
There are many sects I know, who are religiously scrupulous in this respect; I do
not mean to deprive them of any indulgence the law affords; my design is to
guard against those who are of no religion.  It has been urged that religion is on
the decline; if so, the argument is more strong in my favor, for when the time
comes that religion shall be discarded, the generality of persons will have
recourse to these pretexts to get excused from bearing arms.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 767 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
73 Ledewitz, supra note 11, at 53–54 (alteration in original) (citing Welsh, 398 U.S. at
353 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
74 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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“secular beliefs on the other.”75  While the latter argument may hold more
weight, the former would seem to imply that the Free Exercise Clause itself
violates the Establishment Clause.  Although the Court has noted that there
may be a limited “room for play in the joints” between the two clauses,76
surely it is not reasonable to read either so that the two are entirely at odds.77
Tangentially, only one year after Welsh, the Supreme Court decided Gil-
lette, in which the first claimant, Gillette, argued that he objected to the Viet-
nam War “based on a humanist approach to religion,” and the second
claimant, Negre, argued that the Catholic “just war” theory prevented him
from participating in the war.78  Both of these claimants held out their
beliefs as religious in nature, and the Court did not dispute this, although
Justice Douglas contested whether humanism might be fairly construed as
“religious.”79  But the majority of the Court, and Justice Douglas, except in
passing, did not decide whether the claimants’ beliefs were religious in
nature.80  The Court took for granted that they were religious because the
claimants said so.  Thus, although sometimes analyzed in detail,81 any discus-
sion of the “fit” of humanism into religion in Gillette is merely dicta.
C. The Supreme Court’s Definition of Conscience Today
After the Supreme Court’s decisions in these three conscientious objec-
tor cases, some have argued that they represent an exception to the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding religion throughout the 1960s and 1970s.82
It is notable that, after Welsh, it seemed as though the Court would not
require a person’s stated belief system to be “religious” in nature because
secular claims of conscience based on science, history, politics, or moral phi-
75 Id.
76 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S.
712, 718 (2004)); see Davey, 540 U.S. at 719 (“[T]here are some state actions permitted by
the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”).
77 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 465–66 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is true
that the First Amendment speaks of the free exercise of religion, not of the free exercise of
conscience or belief.  Yet conscience and belief are the main ingredients of First Amend-
ment rights.  They are the bedrock of free speech as well as religion.  The implied First
Amendment right of ‘conscience’ is certainly as high as the ‘right of association’ . . . .”).
But see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 181
(2012) (“We have said that [the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause] ‘often
exert conflicting pressures,’ . . . and that there can be ‘internal tension . . . between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.’” (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 677 (1971) (plurality opinion))).
78 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439–41 (1971).
79 Speaking largely of Welsh’s reasons for objection to the draft, Justice Douglas wrote
that “[c]onscience is often the echo of religious faith.  But, as this case illustrates, it may
also be the product of travail, meditation, or sudden revelation related to a moral compre-
hension of the dimensions of a problem, not to a religion in the ordinary sense.” Id. at 466
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 440, 475.
81 See Ledewitz, supra note 11, at 55.
82 See id. at 47.
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losophy were sufficiently close to religion to be protected—even under a stat-
ute that expressly mentions religion as the only basis for protection.  But only
one year after Gillette was decided and two after Welsh, in 1972, the Supreme
Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder.83  In Yoder, the Court wrote that “[a] way of
life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation . . . if it is based on purely secular considerations;
to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in
religious belief.”84  Did this put the nail in the coffin for any attempt to
equate religion and conscience in the law?  The distinction between religion
and secular belief was elaborated upon by Justice Brennan—who had con-
curred in Welsh—in a 1983 dissenting opinion, as he wrote that “in one
important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of religion:
Under the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of conscience
may give rise to constitutional rights that other strongly held beliefs do
not.”85  Notice that Justice Brennan focused on religiously motivated claims of
conscience.  Perhaps the Court’s return to a principled distinction between
religion and secular conscience was an available route only because Welsh was
decided by a plurality of the Court.  But, needless to say, the language of
Yoder seems to directly contradict the plurality’s language in Welsh.  It is with
this understanding that we move to a discussion of the Court’s current con-
ception of the relationship between conscience and religion.
In this discussion, we must consider the rhetoric present in the Court’s
major decisions regarding not only conscience but also personal sovereignty,
as personal sovereignty is often touted as the theoretical basis for liberty of
conscience.86  The famous Casey mystery passage, written in 1992, states that
“[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.”87  Such a definition of liberty has
been echoed by the Court in the years following Casey.88  But other state-
ments made by the Court have taken the position that religious and secular
beliefs—even those dictated by sincere personal convictions—are still not
similar enough to enjoy the same protections under the Constitution.  In
Hosanna-Tabor, a 2012 decision, the Court wrote the following:
83 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
84 Id. at 215–16
85 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 See generally Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Con-
stitution, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445 (1983).
87 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  The mystery
passage was famously written by Justice Kennedy in Casey, a case reaffirming Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88 See, for example, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574, 578–79 (2003), where the
Court, citing Casey’s mystery passage, struck down a sodomy law in Texas based in part on
the individual’s ability to act in accord with his conscience.
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According to the EEOC and [plaintiff], religious organizations could suc-
cessfully defend against employment discrimination claims . . . by invoking
the constitutional right to freedom of association—a right “implicit” in the
First Amendment.  The EEOC and [plaintiff] thus see no need—and no
basis—for a special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion Clauses
themselves.
We find this position untenable.  The right to freedom of association is
a right enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike.  It follows under the
EEOC’s and [plaintiff]’s view that the First Amendment analysis should be
the same, whether the association in question is the Lutheran Church, a
labor union, or a social club.  That result is hard to square with the text of
the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of
religious organizations.  We cannot accept the remarkable view that the
Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s free-
dom to select its own ministers.89
Thus, the majority in Hosanna-Tabor affirmed that there is something
unique about religion.90  Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in the case is even
more relevant, as he wrote:
Throughout our Nation’s history, religious bodies have been the preem-
inent example of private associations that have “act[ed] as critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the State.” . . .  To safeguard . . .
crucial [religious] autonomy, we have long recognized that the Religion
Clauses protect a private sphere within which religious bodies are free to
govern themselves in accordance with their own beliefs.91
Similarly, in another case, decided in 1993, almost twenty years prior,
Justice Souter reiterated the grounding on which the Free Exercise Clause
was based.  He wrote that “[t]he extent to which the Free Exercise Clause
requires government to refrain from impeding religious exercise defines
nothing less than the respective relationships in our constitutional democ-
racy of the individual to government and to God.”92  On the other hand, a
more recent Supreme Case, decided in mid-2018, briefly discussed the “con-
fluence of speech and free exercise principles.”93  In Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a Colorado baker, Jack Phillips, claimed that
his religious beliefs did not permit him to make a custom wedding cake for a
89 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189
(2012) (internal citations omitted).
90 One scholar explains how this “special” treatment given to religion differs from the
Court’s treatment of religion during the draft era. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREE-
DOMS FOR? 43–44 (1996) (explaining how, although the text of the Free Exercise Clause
“seems to favor choices for religion over choices against religion,” the Court “avoid[ed] this
textual limitation [during the draft era by defining] ‘religion’ very broadly—so broadly
that even disbelief is a kind of religion”).  Regarding whether religion is “special,” see
Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VIRGINIA L. REV. 481 (2017).
91 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
92 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
93 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
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gay marriage ceremony—a “marriage[ ] the State of Colorado itself did not
recognize at that time.”94  The 7–2 majority Supreme Court opinion stated
that “[w]hen it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the
clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could not
be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his or her right to
the free exercise of religion.”95  But the Court then clarified that because this
exception would be limited and “well understood in our constitutional order
as an exercise of religion, [it was] an exercise that gay persons could recog-
nize and accept without serious diminishment to their own dignity and
worth.”96  However, this relied on the premise that the exception would need
to be “confined” in some respect so that it would not result in a “community-
wide stigma inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws.”97
The Court’s ultimate decision in favor of Phillips in Masterpiece Cakeshop
was largely limited to and based upon the hostile treatment he received from
the Colorado Commission during the unfolding of his case.  It noted that in
three previous cases, the Colorado Commission had permitted bakers to
refuse to bake cakes which violated their nonreligious consciences.98  But the
Court’s discussion of the case still very clearly separated the language of con-
science—which it used to describe nonreligious decisions and beliefs—and
religion, which it used to describe Phillips’s beliefs that depend on a duty
that he believes is owed to a being higher than the State.  This distinction is
what the Court used to assure that such an exception would be limited.  And
the use of such a discussion prompts the conclusion that the Court’s draft-era
cases may in fact have been an exception to its general inclination to distin-
guish between religion and individual conscience.
IV. SHOULD WE EQUATE RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE?
Under the general conception of conscience today—that of individual
conscience—“conscience grants freedom from coercion regarding beliefs
and actions that violate an individual’s principles.”99  And, as Dhooge
explained in his recent article:
The exercise of conscience is simply different from the exercise of religion.
Religious belief[s] . . . involve some degree of surrender of individual auton-
omy based upon their shared nature.  Conscience-based beliefs and
responses are expressions of autonomy exercising a universal faculty pos-
sessed by all and drawing upon each individual’s pool of moral
knowledge.100
94 Id. at 1723.
95 Id. at 1727.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 1730.
99 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 279; see also OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IN COOPERATION WITH THE INT’L BAR ASS’N, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE 521–630 (2003).
100 Dhooge, supra note 1, at 280 (footnotes omitted).
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Thus, the basis for protecting the exercise of religion—at least as under-
stood by the Founders—is different from the basis for protecting the exercise
of individual, secular conscience.  And although Dhooge recognizes that this
may be true, he nevertheless concludes that religion and conscience demand
moral equivalence and thereby should be protected the same under the
law.101
Primarily, Dhooge argues their equivalence because “[p]rotection of
communal religious beliefs and acts without protection of their individual-
ized and nonreligious equivalents is unfair.”102  He believes that “protection
of religion and conscience constitutes respect for personhood owed to indi-
viduals by their governments.  If religion and conscience are central to indi-
vidual identity, it follows that governmentally-compelled violations infringe
upon personhood.”103  In making his assessment, Dhooge is correct.  For if
religion and conscience should both be protected because they are central to
individual identity, then it would follow that they could be protected together
under a personhood claim.
But this is precisely where Dhooge misses the mark.  For the Founders
did not include the free exercise of religion as a protected right because of
concerns of personhood.  Rather, they included it because of concerns of duty,
and the obligation of the individual to discharge this duty freely and without
coercion.104  In fact, duty to a creator and the ability to follow one’s religious
convictions may be the opposite of individual personhood and autonomy, for
the directions one is following flow from something other than oneself.105  A
respect for the higher duty one owes to God was the basis for the Free Exer-
101 See id. at 280–81.
102 Id. at 280.
103 Id. at 281 (footnote omitted).
104 McConnell, supra note 8, at 1496–97 (“Not until the second third of the nineteenth
century did the notion that the opinions of individuals have precedence over the decisions
of civil society gain currency in American thought.  In 1789, most would have agreed with
Locke that ‘the private judgment [here ‘individual conscience’] of any person concerning
a law enacted in political matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of
that law, nor deserve a dispensation.”  Religious convictions were of a different order.  Con-
flicts arising from religious convictions were conceived not as a clash between the judg-
ment of the individual and of the state, but as a conflict between earthly and spiritual
sovereigns.  The believer was not seen as the instigator of the conflict; the believer was
simply caught between the inconsistent demands of two rightful authorities, through no
fault of his own. . . .  Not only were the spiritual and earthly authorities envisioned as
independent, but in the nature of things the spiritual authorities had a superior claim.
‘[O]bedience is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to the laws’ according to
Locke.” (second alteration in original) (quoting 6 JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Tolera-
tion, in THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1, 43 (photo reprt. 1963) (London, 1823) (1689))).
105 See id. at 1497 (“Far from being based on the ‘respect for the person as an indepen-
dent source of value,’ the free exercise of religion is set apart from mere exercise of human
judgment by the fact that the ‘source of value’ is prior and superior to both the individual
and the civil society.  The freedom of religion is unalienable because it is a duty to God and
not a privilege of the individual.” (quoting DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CON-
STITUTION 142 (1986))).
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cise Clause.  It is possible that the same conclusion could be drawn regarding
the free exercise of one’s conscience; if a person’s conscience holds a higher
claim to his or her actions because the duty to oneself is higher than the duty
to society, the foundation may be the same.  But this is simply a question of
ought. Ought the duty we owe to ourselves be placed higher than the duties
we owe to one another?  Or might we protect individual, secular conscience
claims for different reasons?
If individual conscience should be protected because of a concern for
duty, then it might be fair to ground the right in the Free Exercise Clause.
But if, rather, conscience should be protected out of respect for individual
personhood, then the argument for its protection might be better grounded
elsewhere in the Constitution.  For example, if forcing someone to go against
the dictates of their secular conscience involves an action, then such an act
might be better characterized as expressive conduct, since its suppression
involves the suppression of an individual’s ideas.106  Such a value is closer
linked to the First Amendment’s protection of speech—and thereby expres-
sion—than the protections of religion.  Here, one might argue that the rea-
sons the state protects speech or expression and the reasons it would want to
protect individual conscience are closely aligned.
Alternatively, a person’s right to liberty might more accurately encompass
individual conscience than does that person’s right to the free exercise of
religion.  Again, quoted from a 1992 Supreme Court decision: “At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State.”107  Undoubtedly, this phrase invokes the idea of con-
science as it is used today—in a secular, individual sense.  A person’s
individual conscience helps her to determine “meaning” and her concept of
“the mystery of human life.”108  But instead of claiming that the compulsion
of these beliefs could not then comprise a true faith in God, or a true submis-
sion to a higher power, the Court argues that compelling the state’s concept
of existence, meaning, or the universe upon an individual would not allow
106 Professor Weil argues that this might be the conception that Justice Stevens held
regarding conscience when writing his opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  Patrick Weil, Freedom of Conscience, but Which One? In Search of
Coherence in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Religion Jurisprudence, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 347
(2017).  He then connects this idea to that of John Stuart Mill, who wrote in On Liberty:
[T]he appropriate region of human liberty . . . comprises, first, the inward
domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience . . . . The liberty of
expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different princi-
ple . . . but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself,
and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 82–83 (David
Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale University Press 2003) (1859)).
107 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
108 Id.
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these beliefs to “define the attributes of personhood.”109  This argument
sounds in liberty, and it implies that conscience might be better protected out
of a concern for such liberty.
But by instead choosing—during the draft era—to equate freedom of
conscience with freedom of religion, the Supreme Court has confused the
reasonings behind the protection of both.  Still, the Court has not explicitly
equated the two.  Surely, many questions would arise were the Court to con-
flate conscience with religion and say that the two are equivalent.  To this
point, Dhooge discusses some potential problems:
Deeming religion and conscience as identical fails to provide adequate gui-
dance to courts confronted with issues of application and potential limita-
tions in any given case.  More fundamentally, this overlap fails to “give liberty
of conscience any independent role to play in our scheme of ordered liber-
ties.”  To this order of thought, conscience and its exercise are protected
because they are similar to religion and religiously-motivated actions.  Surely
conscience is deserving of protection on account of its own merit.  Further-
more, protection of religion and religious acts without protection of their
nonreligious equivalents would be unfair.110
Regarding the first part of Dhooge’s statement, this author agrees.  But
while the last part of Dhooge’s argument might be right, his choice to protect
conscience by equating it with religion stands out in particular.  He says that
“protection of religion and religious acts without protection of their nonreli-
gious equivalents would be unfair.”111  Here, Dhooge’s conclusion would
result in finding that the explicit language of the First Amendment itself is
“unfair.”  Maybe so.  For the First Amendment makes no mention of a non-
religious counterpart to religion.  And the Founders did not understand a
secular notion of conscience to be included in religion.  But Dhooge fails to
explicitly address this point.  Instead, he states that “conscience is deserving
of protection on account of its own merit.”112  Again—maybe so.  But at the
very least, conscience should be protected because of the right from which it
stems—possibly, the right to individual autonomy, or “personhood.”  If a pro-
tection for this basic right stems from the Constitution, it might be found in
the First Amendment’s protection of free speech or in what the Court has
routinely meant by “liberty” when discussing the Fourteenth Amendment.113
109 Id.




113 Professor Weil has made an argument that the freedom of conscience might be
protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. See Weil, supra
note 101, at 368–70 (2017) (“[P]rivileges and immunities do not need to be expressed in
the wording of the Constitution to be recognized as such.  Isn’t the freedom of conscience
a privilege and immunity as well?  Surging from an original repression in the final wording
of the First Amendment to the Constitution, freedom of conscience has come back in
contemporary jurisprudence above explicitly enumerated constitutional rights as a kind of
absolute right that trumps the formal expression of First Amendment liberties in the name
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Or it might be true that if the Constitution does not protect conscience,
it should.  But “conscience” protections should not be arbitrarily attached to
religious protections simply because the attributes of secular conscience
mean that it holds a similar place in a person’s life as that held by religion.
The Free Exercise Clause did not protect religion because people feel guilt
or as though they have misrepresented their own “personhood” or have been
robbed of their individual “sovereignty” when forced to violate their religious
beliefs.  Instead, the First Amendment protected religion out of respect for
God’s sovereignty.  The Founders believed that sincerely religious people
should be allowed to act in accord with the duties they held outside of them-
selves: their duties to the state, and their higher duties to God.
CONCLUSION
This Note does not opine on whether or not conscience should receive
protection under the law.  It is worth noting that individual liberties and
rights are not confined to those listed in the Bill of Rights.114  While
entrenching particular liberties was important to the Founders in order to
safeguard the rights of the people, the Bill of Rights was not meant to be
exhaustive.  Instead, the people were assured that they still held rights and
liberties outside of those expressly mentioned.  Freedom of conscience might
be one of them.  But the protection of this freedom would be founded on
different principles that the protection of the freedom of religion.  The duty-
based argument underlying the freedom of religion likely does not extend to
the freedom of conscience.  And contrary to Dhooge’s claims, we should not
protect two distinct rights as if they are the same simply because we believe
that one is just as important as the other.
As a society, we may want to protect the free exercise of both religion
and conscience.  But equating conscience directly with religion is a danger-
ous method to employ even if the result is desirable, as it threatens to weaken
both rights by pulling on the limits of either one or the other.115  Instead of
roughly equating religion and conscience and treating them as though they
are the same under the law, we must consider and respect the different foun-
dations underlying the protections of each.  What to do with this understand-
ing moving forward is left for further scholarship.  But in order to have a
of a higher liberty.  Finding a space for this right in constitutional interpretation would
increase the Constitution’s ability to guarantee other rights, give a direction to the jurispru-
dence on religion, and emphasize its place in the meaning and purposes of the American
Republic since its founding.”).
114 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
115 Professor McConnell contends that “if the exercise of religion extends to ‘every-
thing and anything,’ the interference with ordinary operations of government would be so
extreme that the free exercise clause would fall of its own weight.  To protect everything is
to protect nothing.” McConnell, supra note 8, at 1493 (quoting Richards, supra note 100, at
141); see also Steven D. Smith, The Case of the Exemption Claimants: Religion, Conscience, and
Identity (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 18-345, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171176.
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fruitful conversation regarding the merits of “equating” religion and con-
science, these foundational differences must be taken into account.  Just as
the archer must set his feet before taking his calculated shot, so too must we
consider these foundations before rushing forward with a conclusion.
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